Dealing with the local level power structure: findings from a qualitative study of three villages in Greater Faridpur District by Lewis, David & Hossain, Abul
  
David Lewis, Abul Hossain 
Dealing with the local level power structure: 
findings from a qualitative study of three 
villages in Greater Faridpur District 
 




 Original citation: Lewis, David and Hossain, Abul (2018) Dealing with the local level power structure: findings from 
a qualitative study of three villages in Greater Faridpur District. Journal of Bangladesh Studies, 
18 (1-2). ISSN 1529-0905 
 
© 2018 Bangladesh Development Initiative 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90248/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 






Dealing with the Local Level Power Structure: Findings 
from a Qualitative Study of Three Villages in Greater 
Faridpur District 
 
David Lewis*      Abul Hossain† 
 
*London School of Economics & Political Science, UK 
†Green University of Bangladesh 
 
[Journal of Bangladesh Studies 18 (1&2), 2018] 
 
Abstract 
As World Development Report 2017 reminded us, understanding how the local power structure works, and how it 
is perceived, continue to be important themes for mainstream development policy and practice. Power 
asymmetries contribute to exclusion, inequality and restrict equitable growth. This paper reports on findings from 
a recent re-study that aimed to build a bottom-up view of how ordinary people try to deal with local power 
structures, comparing data from 2004 and 2016. Using semi-structured interviews, disaggregated focus groups and 
local participant observation, data was collected in Greater Faridpur District in order to gain more insight into the 
workings of the formal and informal institutions that govern peoples’ everyday lives. Continuing a trend observed 
in the earlier data, the traditional village ‘net’ power structure has continued to fade, providing people with a wider 
set of livelihood choices and institutional options. 
However, while we had encountered examples of win-win pro-poor coalitions in the earlier study between 
local people, civil society groups and elected officials, such cases were far fewer in 2016. Although reforms have 
been put in place ostensibly to increase levels of local civic engagement, it is not easy to find evidence that these 
are working. Civil society space has diminished, along with opportunities for rights-based action to secure justice 
and inclusion. A decline in the Union Parishad’s role and status as the basic institution of local government is a 
further worrying change that has negative implications for improving poor people’s participation in local decision-
making, achieving productive local government and civil society partnerships, and securing improved levels of 




Improving development policy and practice requires us 
to pay attention to the ways that power operates at the 
local level. World Development Report 2017: Govern-
ance and the Law (WDR) makes the case that effective 
governance can only be achieved by taking power 
asymmetries more fully into account. In order to make 
institutions work for power people, there is an overall 
need to move beyond technical ‘capacity building’ and 
‘best practice’ approaches to engage more fully with 
inclusive forms of political decision making, including 
contestation, coordination, participation, and coalition 
building (World Bank 2017). This paper discusses how 
these issues play out locally in one locality in 
Bangladesh, where efforts to build the capacity and 
effectiveness of local government are set against the 
everyday realities of how power and politics operate to 
shape local people’s lives. 
Drawing on a set of new qualitative data collected 
during 2016-17, this article reports on findings from a 
study that aimed to build a bottom-up view of how 
ordinary people try to deal with the local power 
structure.1 Using semi-structured interviews, disaggre-
gated focus groups and participant observation, data was 
gathered in Greater Faridpur in order to gain insights 
into the workings of both the formal and informal 
institutions that govern peoples’ everyday lives. The aim 
of the research was to address two central questions: 
‘what does the local power structure look like?’ and ‘is it 
changing in ways that can enable people living in 
poverty to make stronger claims on rights and 
entitlements?’ The study aimed to document the barriers 
and challenges that people face as they seek to maintain 
and further their livelihoods. In this way the study aims 
to complement more conventional macro-level analyses 
of power being undertaken at country level. 
In order to study the local power structure five main 
sets of institutions were identified and these are set out 
in Table 1. The first is the Union, the most visible 
element of decentralised local government, with its 
locally elected council or parishad and nested beneath 
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the Upazila (UPZ) sub-district and Zila district structures 
(see Siddiqi and Ahmed, 2016). The second element we 
identify as the political structures that lead from 
Parliament down into community level politics in the 
form of local political party structures and activists. 
Third is the formal judiciary from High Court down to 
the Village Court system, and finally there are the 
various civil society organisations and activities that we 
characterise as both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ categories. 
We use formal civil society to encapsulate the NGOs 
and other established associational forms, and informal 
civil society to include ad hoc collective action groups 
such as those formed locally and temporarily to protect 
rights, as well as traditional social structures such as 
samaj and shalish. 
Fieldwork was carried out in three contrasting 
locations: one peri-urban, one well-connected, and one 
remote village community.2 The new study followed up 
on earlier research carried out by the authors out in the 
same communities during 2004 (Lewis and Hossain 
2008). It is comparatively rare for revisit studies of this 
kind to be undertaken in order to compare past and 
present (but see Jansen and Rahman 2011 for an 
exception), so it is hoped that it offers a useful glimpse is 
afforded into changing realities. Central to the analysis is 
the enduring role of patron-client relations as key 
elements of the power structure, creating institutional 
arrangements that bring both benefits and risks for 
poorer people (Gay, 1998; Banks, 2015). Other key 
concepts used in the analysis of the data included 
governance, informality, empowerment, and patriarchy. 
 
Findings from the Earlier Study 
The aim of the original study was to understand issues of 
power and governance in anthropological terms ‘from 
the ground up’. It focused on both the ‘traditional’ 
village power structure (the system of elders, structure of 
landholding, and its mechanisms for resolving disputes) 
as well as on villagers’ relationships with the Union 
Parishad (UP), the lowest main tier of local government. 
It also documented the presence of non-state actors such 
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local 
associations, and analysed their changing roles and 
significance. A key assumption made in the study was 
that the power structure was dynamic rather than static, 
and that even its so-called ‘traditional’ aspects were 
evolving and changing (Mannan 2015).  
The mid-2000s was a period when there was growing 
investment in local infrastructure and this was slowly 
improving connectivity and market access. A diverse 
range of NGOs were delivering services and working on 
rights-based approaches to development (such as 
improving land rights for the poor) in attempts to foster 
more inclusive development at the local level. The UP 
was placed at the centre of ongoing decentralization 
efforts aimed at strengthening their capacities and 
inclusiveness (Ahmed et al 2010). Both the UP and the 
shalish were receiving support from government and 
international agencies that aimed to make them more 
democratic and participatory, and to improve gender 
inclusivity.  
At the same time, mirroring the national situation of 
dysfunctional gridlock between the two main political 
coalitions led by the Awami League (AL) and the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), there was a high 
level of political polarization between supporters of 
government and opposition parties. This was played out 
within increasing factionalism and the increasing 
politicization of local level decision-making and 
resource allocation, sometimes leading to conflict. 
A central aspect of the original study was that the 
insights it provided into the institution of patronage. 
Forms of patron-client linkages – such as the unequal 
forms of reciprocal relationship between wealthy 
landowners and poor tenants that have long dominated 
rural communities – are an important element of the 
local power structure. Our earlier study had reported that 
the patronage relationships that govern local power 
relationships were becoming less rigid. This finding was 
in contrast with studies such as The Net: Power 
Structure in Ten Villages (BRAC, 1982) which had 
emphasised the rigid nature of the traditional village 
level power structure and the propensity of village elites 
to capture any resources provided by government to 
support the local poor, and limit the latter’s attempts to 
organise in pursuit of their interests.3 
There was now a wider selection of potential patrons 
available for poorer people to choose from - including 
local elected officials, party politicians, NGOs and local 
business leaders, and a range of intermediaries through 
which such people could be approached. This diversi-
fication, we argued, was contributing to a local level 
power structure that was slowly becoming less unitary. 
Instead it was becoming what Mannan (2015) has 
termed a ‘multifocal power structure’ that allowed more 
economic, political and social ‘room for manoeuvre’ for 
disadvantaged groups in their negotiations with local 
elites. The ‘net’ metaphor had referred to relationships 
that had mainly served to constrain people (while also 
offering a measure of protection), but the new situation 
could be understood as something that was more akin to 
a ‘web’. This implied a set of relationships that were 
now also based on the important of building 
connections, increasingly important for linking people 
with productive resources and opportunities (see 
Gardner 2012). People could still get caught up in the 
web, but they could also move across its many strands 
and create potentially useful new connections. 
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We also found there to be emerging synergies 
between local government and civil society actors. In 
some cases, these were leading to strengthening of the 
rights of the poor (such as in relation to improved land 
rights) and enabling more participation in local decision-
making (such as influencing which local infrastructure 
projects were given priority by UP works committees). 
We found evidence for forms of positive, negotiated 
change taking place locally that we thought might be 
sustainable, in spite of the overall context of a turbulent 
and unstable national and local political system that had 
become highly adversarial and polarised between two 
confrontational political party blocs. For example, civil 
society organisations could sometimes work with an 
elected UP leader to help strengthen local land rights for 
people if this increased his popularity. Traditional 
village elites might accept more gender-inclusive shalish 
arrangements if this increased their reputation and 
prestige, and brought in more outside resources. The 
main source of power was no longer solely land 
ownership, but also increasingly important were the 
connections people were able to make to resources 
outside the village that they could then distribute: such 
as development resources, political linkages, and 
employment and migration opportunities (see Gardner 
2012). Finally, the study also found a high degree of 
local diversity: that these issues were playing out very 
differently across the three village settings studied, 
leading to the finding that context and locality – such as 
the state of the economy, types of civil society that were 
active, and the individual strategies of local political 
leaders - mattered considerably. 
Summing up the findings and recommendations from 
the first study (Lewis and Hossain 2008, p.13) we 
commented: 
Many people who live in poverty in rural 
Bangladesh still have little faith that local 
institutions will provide the means to secure 
rights or justice, but our study found some 
evidence that those with power can sometimes 
respond positively to negotiation and pressure 
from civil society around creating potential win-
win outcomes which can benefit both poor and 
non-poor people. For example, we found that a 
union chairman may cooperate with an NGO that 
is seeking to strengthen land rights for the poor if 
it helps to build a stronger political support base 
for him. Similarly, when previously excluded 
people, such as landless women, campaign to take 
up positions within governance institutions such 
as the union or the shalish, either on the basis of 
bottom-up or top-down pressures, small areas of 
opportunity and policy ‘space’ are sometimes 
opened up. The challenge for the future is to 
combine understanding of this complex 
‘micropolitics’ of local change with support for 
the strengthening of broader economic and 
political pro-poor change at the district and 
national levels.  
Four practical insights were drawn from the original 
study, in terms of the need: (i) for designing and 
implementing interventions that recognise and build 
upon local institutional difference and diversity; (ii) 
finding opportunities for the identification of win-win 
coalitions with elites to help secure sustainable pro-poor 
change; (iii) supporting NGOs and civil society 
alongside broader institutional support to local and 
central government; and (iv) recognising more fully the 
importance of economic development as a foundation 
for sustainable governance reform and community level 
empowerment. 
 
Findings from the New Study 
Returning to these communities more than a decade later 
revealed many changes. 
The country’s longstanding ‘illiberal democracy’ has 
now moved in a new direction, away from the old 
bipartisan political system in which two competing 
political blocs of AL and BNP had alternated in power. 
Following the 2007 military-backed Caretaker 
Government, an AL-led alliance won a majority at the 
29 December 2008 general election. After disagreement 
around the reform of the arrangements for the January 
2014 elections, the BNP refused to take part and the AL 
was re-elected unopposed for an unprecedented second 
term in government. This means that with the political 
opposition is in disarray, the AL is now dominant and, 
and the nature of what Hassan (2013) has called 
Bangladesh’s ‘partyarchy’ has changed. There are 
concerns that restrictions on the activities of mainstream 
parties could create a vacuum in which a new extremist 
threatens to the stability of political institutions and the 
country’s record of relatively inclusive growth (Khan 
2017). 
The AL government has enhanced the authority of 
Members of Parliament (MPs) by giving them an 
advisory role on the local UPZ sub-district authorities. 
According to Siddiqui and Ahmed (2016, p.574) this has 
made worse a situation in which ‘MPs dictate instead of 
advising the affairs of local government’. It has also 
further politicised the local administrative system by 
allowing party affiliation to play a greater role in local 
UP activities. In 2016, elections were held with political 
party affiliations on the ballot paper for the first time 
(instead of just a candidate’s name as before). This may 
also have been a factor that contributed to increased 
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election violence during these elections (Siddiqui and 
Ahmed 2016).  
The economy has continued to perform very well in 
terms of growth in the period since the earlier study. 
According to UNDP (2016), Bangladesh has seen a 
‘major economic transformation’ in recent years, 
growing an average 6.3% between 2011-15, and 7.1% in 
the 2016 financial year. Poverty has declined from 
31.5% of the population in 2011 to 24.7% in 2015 below 
the national poverty line. There have been impressive 
gains in productivity and infrastructure improvement. 
Bangladesh’s social development indicators improved as 
measured against the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). A new National Social Security Strategy 
(NSSS) has been put in place with the potential to better 
address social protection in terms of multiple 
dimensional needs and risks.4 The government’s Seventh 
Five Year Plan (2016-20) aims to further increase 
growth, build more citizen inclusion, and strengthen 
resilience. 
Major challenges remain with high levels of extreme 
poverty (12.9% of the total population in 2015-16), 
along with growing inequality and increasing 
vulnerability. Growth has been achieved at the expense 
of high levels of environmental damage. Women remain 
disadvantaged in terms of earnings (52% lower than 
men’s) and labour market participation (34% as opposed 
to 82% for men). Women’s low economic status is 
reflected in high levels of gender-based violence 
(experienced by 65% of women in the last 12 months 
according to a recent government study). The country 
also has the fourth highest rate of child marriage in the 
world, a statistic that the government attempted to bring 
down by reducing the legal age of marriage from 18 to 
16 years of age.5 The informal sector remains the main 
source of urban employment. Democracy and 
governance are still deeply problematic, with low levels 
of civic participation, high levels of corruption (147th 
out of 167 according to Transparency International), and 
relatively little progress being made with civil service 
reform and building more transparent institutions. Tax 
revenue collection is below 10% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) making the level, quality and 
sustainability of public services generally low.  
Revisiting the five institutions that make up the 
power structure, we find some key changes. First at the 
level of the three tier administrative system of Zila, 
UPZ, and Union the 2009 Local Government (Union 
Parishad) Act has created some important changes. This 
reform created a new local Ward ‘sabha’ (council) 
meeting system, introduced a Citizen Charter, and 
brought measures to increase women’s representation. 
There has also been a shift in political institutions. After 
failing to contest the last general election a severely 
weakened political opposition now leaves the ruling 
Awami League (AL) party as the dominant and largely 
unchallenged political actor in a way that is quite 
different from before. Local UP elections – which took 
place at the time of the fieldwork in early 2016 - have 
also become more politicised, and there was widespread 
violence reported in many areas of the country. 
Compared to 2004, MPs have gained more power to 
intervene locally in direct ways, giving them greater 
influence over how local development activities are 
carried out and to whom welfare and relief entitlements 
are distributed.  
At the level of civil society, we find that economic 
support from NGOs in our communities has expanded, 
but that the wider NGO sector itself is less diverse. 
Rights-based NGO development work with the poorest 
has largely faded away. There is also a higher degree of 
political control of local civil society associations. 
Informal civil society in Greater Faridpur has continued 
to decline in its traditional forms, such as the local 
village level institutions. However, we do find cases of 
local level protest and community level action, 
sometimes taking ‘unruly’ forms. Finally, there are 
changes to the judiciary, including more flexible forms 
of the shalish (traditional dispute settlement meetings) 
and a continuing decline of the formal Village Court 
system. 
What are the main findings from the new study in 
each of the three study locations? The peri-urban village 
today has experienced sustained economic growth that 
has improved local livelihoods. The area is more 
urbanised and will soon be absorbed into the local City 
Corporation. People report that local businesses are 
doing well, and that economic support from NGOs is 
useful and appreciated. The law and order situation is 
reported to be good, and there is a positive level of 
communal harmony between different religious and 
ethnic groups locally. There is strong community 
support for efforts to discourage underage marriages by 
government and NGOs. Forms of ‘traditional’ authority 
such as the matbars (village elders) continue to lose 
power. Compared with before, the elected UP has 
become less central to local development processes. 
With a UP Chair who at the time of the fieldwork was 
affiliated to the political opposition, local ruling party 
activists with the support of the local MP have set up 
informal by-pass arrangements that ensure that they 
maintain as much control as possible over local affairs.  
The ruling party has also increased its influence over 
local civil society groups such as School Committees 
and Business Associations, contributing to a higher level 
of local politicisation than we had found before. The 
types of win-win pro-poor coalitions between local 
leaders and civil society at UP level that we encountered 
in the earlier study are much less common today. 
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However, there are still cases of small-scale informal 
community-level civil society action, such as the 
organisation of a defence group to challenge the threat of 
loss of water rights by local interest groups. 
The well-connected village has also substantially 
improved its infrastructure and its local economy. The 
expansion of national and international migration 
opportunities, supported by government and NGOs, has 
had positive effects on local livelihoods. However, we 
found growing politicisation of local level institutions 
here as well, with the ruling party deploying informal 
strategies to work around the locally elected opposition-
affiliated UP Chair. With the backing of the local MP, 
the UPZ Chair – who was formerly the UP Chair during 
our earlier study, and is AL-affiliated - extends party 
power by managing a patronage network in terms of 
access to jobs and local positions on committees and 
civil society groups, to some extent side-lining the UP. 
He nevertheless retains his solid local reputation for 
settling disputes fairly, with shalish arrangements that 
are reported as mainly working well. His a relative is the 
local UP Chair, which is another factor that helps in 
managing the relationship, suggesting that clan-based 
politics continues to provide a measure of stability to 
local institutions, even where there are party political 
differences. In this location formal rights-based civil 
society action by development NGOs has also become 
less common since the earlier research period. In its 
place there are more NGO loans and new forms of small 
business support, and our focus groups indicated that 
these are well liked by both poor and non-poor people. 
There are no reports of people struggling to repay their 
NGO loans as we had come across last time.  
In the remote village, the picture is different. Despite 
its relative proximity to the local town, this is a village 
that remains comparatively isolated, cut off by a large 
river. Here there has been comparatively little infrastruc-
tural development that can improve local connectivity or 
enhance access to economic opportunities. Livelihoods 
opportunities are far fewer than we encountered in the 
other two study areas, and most people’s economic 
position remains less favourable. Severe environmental 
pressures are also experienced by these communities in 
the form of large-scale river erosion, perhaps exacer-
bated by climate factors. This instability has caused 
many households to leave their homestead and farmland 
and resettle. Economic pressure has led to increased out-
migration more from a position of weakness than from 
one of relative strength, as observed in the other two 
locations. Dhaka’s expanding local informal sector 
garment industry (as opposed to the ready-made garment 
export sector) has become a growing source of new 
small-scale economic opportunities for many households 
in this community, though it is not as lucrative as 
opportunities observed in the other two areas, and 
appears to be strongly dependent on expanding the use 
of child labour as young teenage boys are the main 
travellers to the garment sector.  
Once again, we found that there had been the relative 
marginalization of the local opposition party UP Chair. 
The MP had a high level of control over the distribution 
of externally provided resources from government, 
which he achieved through the use of a loyal party 
‘informal coordinator’, who was also a UP member. 
With him as an intermediary, it became possible for 
party activists to bypass the normal UP level distribution 
system for local entitlements such as Test Relief and 
Food for Work (FFW), and this helped to consolidate a 
set of more politicised patronage networks. Last time we 
had found one or two relief-oriented NGOs operating 
here that were providing basic welfare goods and 
services. Today there are more NGOs than before 
operating in the area, and these organisations are now 
providing business training services and small-scale 
loans designed to improve economic opportunities. But 
there was little evidence of rights-based work or local 
advocacy by NGOs. The area is less socially progressive 
than the others, with for example more persistence of 
child marriage, which some claimed was linked with 
increased mobile phone and social media use. This was 
seen as intensifying concerns about family honour and 
reputation, particularly among the poorest households.  
 
Discussion: Implications of the 
Changing Local Power Structure 
Overall our findings suggest that local change has been 
unbalanced: there is significant economic development 
that is occurring but without much counterpart political 
development. Market connectivity is much higher than 
before, which means that people have better access to 
economic opportunities, but opportunities for enhanced 
participation in local decision making have not increased 
to the same degree. Poorer people still understand the 
power structure primarily as a highly personalised set of 
informal relationships with more powerful people, 
including but not restricted to, elected or administrative 
officials. The main actors in the power structure remain 
the same as before, but the power of MPs has increased, 
along with the growth of politicisation within the local 
power structure.  
Continuing a trend that was identified last time, there 
is a more multifocal power structure that increasingly 
governs people’s access to political and economic 
opportunities, as compared to the previous unifocal one 
in which people were dependent on the power of local 
landowning elites. This means that power structure is 
becoming more flexible than before, and people’s access 
to connections, information and resources has broad-
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ened. Despite a high level of agency, resourcefulness 
and creativity shown by many households, dealing with 
the power structure requires constant effort to build 
connections and negotiate partisan political interests in 
order to access opportunities, resources and entitlements. 
Furthermore, the diversity of NGO work has declined, 
leading to more economic support but less rights-based 
work that could support more inclusivity.  
The process of formal decentralisation has been 
disappointing. A very concerning finding is the 
increasing marginalisation of the UP, which is intended 
to be a key tier of decentralised local government. This 
has in part been driven by the increasing dominance of 
the power of MPs who are seeking to build political 
support directly in local communities in order to manage 
their vote banks. The UP is increasingly being bypassed 
as a potentially inclusive and accountable centre of local 
decision-making and resource distribution, as MPs play 
more direct roles in local affairs. This is particularly the 
case where local UP chairs are affiliated to opposition 
groups. This has negative implications for the various 
local government ‘capacity building’ efforts that 
continue to take place aimed at strengthening 
participation and civic engagement (GoB 2014). While 
we found in 2004 that the UP’s role was increasing in 
significance and that it was becoming a little more 
inclusive, this time local people told us that ‘The UP’s 
glory is now in the past’. The aim of encouraging closer 
collaboration between UPs and NGOs in local 
development work that was embedded in the 2009 UP 
Act has not materialised. The modest gains towards 
increased women’s representation in local bodies are a 
useful step forward, even if many report the continuing 
marginalization of women within actual decision-
making processes.  
The extension of the ruling party’s power means that 
local power relations in each of our locations have been 
further incorporated into the wider ‘political game’. The 
use of informal strategies is becoming a key tool for this 
incorporation. If there is an elected official in place who 
is inconveniently affiliated to the main opposition party, 
they are simply ‘worked around’ by the creation by the 
ruling party of informal coordinator and intermediation 
roles based on a patron-client relationship. In the same 
way, key local civil society organizations such as 
business associations are increasingly being co-opted by 
placing politically affiliated individuals in charge. One 
overall result is that local political competition has been 
reduced since the earlier study. This is a cause for 
concern because it leaves people with fewer 
opportunities to represent their interests, and because of 
fears that the opposition vacuum could become filled in 
the future by political or religious extremists. It also 
makes less likely the possibility that future new 
independent political leaders might emerge from local 
civil society. Competition is instead expressed through 
increased local factionalism within ruling party, evident 
from the tensions between MP and UPZ/UP levels in the 
peri-urban site. This might be taken as hinting at future 
instability. However, we did not find evidence of 
extremist political activity in our study areas. 
Furthermore, locally distributed resources are still 
being mobilised in ways that give ordinary people little 
influence or control over decisions. Furthermore, such 
resources are being drawn from the centre, rather than 
being raised locally through taxes (even though a strong 
economy means there is increasing potential for doing 
this). The political interests are directly served by the 
allocation of resources at local level. Recently changed 
rules that now allow for the formation of Project 
Implementation Committees without needing a UP 
member as Chair contribute further to this. Nevertheless, 
the increased range of social safety net services, 
including new forms of support for disabled people, are 
proving relatively effective measures to reduce exclusion 
even with their politicised distribution.  
When it comes to informal civil society institutions, 
we found that a resilient (though shifting) set of 
patronage relations remains at the heart of UP and Ward 
level meetings and activities. We did find some cases of 
poor people taking small-scale collective action to 
address local problems, such as land rights, often 
assisted by more powerful supportive patrons (such as 
journalists or lawyers). But aside from these messy 
spaces of ‘political society’ (cf Chatterjee 2004) in 
which people with relatively little power attempt to 
contest and negotiate, we did not find evidence of the 
kind of progressive social movements that some 
observers have hoped might emerge in support of social 
and political rights more widely. More positively, we 
found less presence of local mastan criminal 
intermediaries than some studies from other parts of 
Bangladesh might lead us to expect (e.g. Khan and 
Stidsen 2014). 
Civil society space, as we have seen, has been 
shrinking both in the sense that it has become mainly 
dominated by market approaches to development (loans, 
business support) and because fewer rights-based or 
radical organizations are in evidence. The decline of 
rights-based development NGOs is a result of many 
complex factors, including tensions with government, 
internal organizational problems, practical difficulties 
with local mobilization approaches, and changing donor 
support trends (Lewis 2017). Their relative absence 
raises short-term problems for poor people seeking to 
advance their rights, and longer-term problems for 
progress with decentralization and local accountability. 
In the earlier study we found that when NGOs and local 
authorities worked together through building productive 
coalitions or forming appropriate partnership 
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arrangements there were sometimes positive outcomes 
for poorer people. Today there is less countervailing 
pressure from civil society visible on issues such as land 
rights or the use of extra-judicial killings, because to do 
so would risk problems from local AL leaders. 
Nevertheless, the possibility remains that the 
government strategy of building a co-opted civil society 
into a unified national development approach is one that 
may yet bring stable and inclusive economic growth, 
even if this is achieved at a high political cost.  
 
Conclusion 
We began with a focus on two central research questions 
that asked: ‘what does the local power structure look 
like?’ and ‘is it changing in ways that can enable people 
living in poverty to make stronger claims on rights and 
entitlements?’ 
The answer to the first question is that the local 
power structure continues to have both formal and 
informal dimensions, with patronage relations at its 
centre. Today, we are less optimistic that the loosening 
of the power structure that we had observed in our 
earlier study is likely to continue. Despite the efforts to 
build the capacity of local government through a series 
of donor-funded initiatives, the increased local influence 
of MPs means that the ruling political party has 
consolidated power in local areas at the expense of local 
decentralising institutions such as the UP. Civil society 
space has also become reduced, particularly that 
formerly occupied by radical NGOs and civil society 
groups seeking to address local rights-based 
development in relation to land, local political 
participation and civic engagement.  
The question as to whether recent changes are 
enabling people to make stronger claims to advance their 
livelihoods cannot be answered simply. There are fewer 
opportunities for the types of win-win coalitions that we 
had identified in the earlier study and predicted would 
become more frequent. Today ruling party political 
interests have increasingly captured local associations 
and other civil society groups. This means that while 
there is a wider range of patrons available (for example, 
in the form of local media supported activism and 
sympathetic local journalists), opportunities for poorer 
people to build horizontal forms of solidarity remain 
limited. Connected to this trend, local level political 
competition has also diminished because the ruling 
political party has consolidated its control of the local 
power structure and has weakened local political 
opposition. The forms of political competition that do 
take place are now primarily expressed through 
increasing factionalism at local level within the ruling 
party.  
The combination of stronger local livelihoods and 
reduced democratic space is producing mixed outcomes 
for poor men and women. Undoubtedly, the ruling party 
is delivering increased prosperity and a degree of 
stability. Economic growth makes people more 
optimistic about the future, particularly younger people. 
There are small gains specifically for women in both the 
economic and the local government decision-making 
spheres, even though many constraints remain. There are 
encouraging signs that informal civil society action 
remains vigorous, along with other forms of ‘rude 
accountability’ (Hossain, 2010) in which people 
occasionally confront abuses by those with more power. 
But the overall picture of economic gain has not come 
without cost – in the form of ‘political pain’. The formal 
power structure may be becoming more fragile, brittle 
and less resilient than before. The ruling party’s 
increasing dominance within the networks that connect 
people with less power to those with more comes at a 
cost. 
Elements of an older power structure remain, with 
the persistence of patron-client relations, elite clan 
politics and patriarchal norms, but these too are slowly 
changing. The range of patrons people can access has 
continued to widen, increasing opportunities for those 
with less power to pursue more favourable forms of 
connection. Within the power structure, the blurring of 
formal and informal roles and relationships has also 
continued, creating a complex ‘web’ of relationships that 
limits civic engagement but nevertheless offers up some 
opportunities for incremental inclusive change. Progress 
with achieving women’s political inclusion into local 
institutions is occurring, albeit at a slow rate. Ordinary 
people are seeking to advance their interests within a 
wider framework of political and social institutions that 
may be becoming less flexible and more brittle. Today 
we find less resilience in the system in two senses: (i) 
while still currently relatively inclusive, the existing 
system could fracture if there is sudden political change 
and disruption in the future; and (ii) for poorer 
households, falling foul of the ruling party’s patronage 
will have serious consequences, with fewer alternative 
non-affiliated patrons to whom they can turn. The social 
protection system is particularly vulnerable to political 
capture at the local level. There is a need to protect those 
people who are left behind within the overall picture of 
positive growth, such as those living in marginal 
locations, minority communities, and women who face 
continuing marginalization within formal governance 
structures. 
Today economic growth is now front and centre in 
mainstream development policy, but we cannot afford 
for this to be at the expense of diversity, inclusion, and 
civil society action. The continuing value of economic 
growth to improving livelihoods is clear, but achieving 
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‘inclusive growth’ remains a challenging goal. Our 
analysis highlights the risk that economic gain displaces 
issues of inclusivity, participation and rights. Supporting 
local government and civil society in mutually 
reinforcing ways remains key to securing growth within 
inclusion. But it has become more difficult today, given 
the decline of rights-based civil society actors such as 
NGOs. The presence of types of informal civil society 
and the persistence of forms of ‘rude accountability’ 
(Hossain, 2010) nevertheless provide some cause for 
optimism in this regard. We still argue there is a need to 
avoid ‘one size fits all’ approaches and that it is vital to 
pay close attention to local difference. People in the 
remote location are made more vulnerable by 
environmental vulnerability and poor infrastructure. Our 
data also suggests the need to continue to treat with 
caution generalizations about what is happening in 
Bangladesh, such as those commonly made in relation to 
extremism, intolerance and religious tensions. Finally, 
the need to find ways to support pro-poor coalitions 
involving local elites remains, even though we found 
fewer cases of NGOs working constructively with local 
officials and informal power holders to address local 
problems. 
As WDR 2017 reminds us, understanding how the 
local power structure works, and how it is perceived, 
continue to be important themes for mainstream 
development policy and practice. Power asymmetries 
contribute to exclusion, inequality and restrict equitable 
growth. Our re-study found levels of coalition building 
between local government leader and civil society 
groups to be lower than those we had encountered in 
2004. Although there are some reforms in place that 
have been designed to increase levels of civic 
engagement it is not easy to find evidence that these are 
working. The decline of the UP’s role and position as the 
crucial lowest institution of local government is a change 
that brings negative implications for poor people’s 
participation in decision-making, for joint government 
and civil society pro-poor coalition building, and for 
increasing local resource mobilisation. The implications 
of this decline are political and should not be seen as 
purely technical. This finding supports the WDR’s 
argument that we need to think beyond technical 
‘capacity building’ of local institutions to engage more 
fully with power issues in supporting more inclusive 
growth. There is a continuing need for policy makers 
and development agencies to prioritise civic 
engagement, coalition-building and forms of bargaining 
that can take better account of the needs of those people 
excluded from growth, and whose interests are captured 
by those seeking to maintain the status quo.  
 
Endnotes 
1. The full study can be accessed at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
82224/1/17_0385%20Sida%20Report_v5_JustifiedCopy.p
df. 
2. We gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of an 
outstanding field team: Mr Abdur Rahman Liton, Mr 
Shakhawat Hossain Taslim, Ms Irfath Ara Iva, Ms Shamsun 
Naher, Mr Md. Belal Hossain, and Mr Md. Abu Alam. 
Liton, The main fieldwork was undertaken in December 
2015-January 2016. It preceded the UP elections that were 
held in six phases between January and June 2016. The 
precise location of each of the study sites was concealed to 
maintain anonymity and security. 
3. It also showed how ‘vertical’ patron-client relations 
between rich and poor (such as landlord/tenant, landowner/ 
sharecropper, moneylender/loanee) were central to social 
structures, making the formation of such grassroots groups 
based on ‘horizontal’ links or ‘social capital’ difficult. 
Following findings from studies such as The Net, 
government and NGOs began searching for ways to bypass 
village elites and work directly with the poor through 
forming grassroots groups and better ‘targeting’.  
4. There has been an expansion of social protection measures 
since the earlier study. There are now a total of 145 ‘social 
safety net’ schemes that are now being provided through a 
total of 23 different government ministries. Around 25-
50% is estimated not to reach the intended recipients due to 
poor targeting and corruption. However, only 2.2% of GDP 
is currently allocated to social safety net expenditure, 
compared with 6-8% for other middle-income countries 
(‘Allocate more for social safety nets’, Star Business 
Report, Daily Star, 11 April, 2016). 
5. Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/ 
09/bangladesh-girls-damaged-child-marriage, accessed 
November 18, 2016. 
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Table 1: Formal and informal institutions in the local power structure 





Ministries and 15 
Divisions) 
300 member Parliament 
elected directly by 
constituents, plus 50 
women members selected 
by MPs. (Since January 
2014 all MPs are AL or its 
allies Jatiya Party, Workers 
Party and some 
independents after main 
opposition BNP boycotted 
election) 
 
Bilateral and multilateral 
international donors 




High Court National NGOs 
(e.g. BRAC) 
 












Elites and their formal 
and informal 
relationships (e.g. 
positions of power in 
government, civil 
society, business plus 
patronage and kin 
networks) 
 
Social norms e.g. 
gender relations 
Departments (254) and 
Directorates, boards 
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(173) with civil service 
of c. 950,000 staff 
 
Divisions (6) 
    
Zila (district) Parishads 
(64) (unelected) 
City Corporations (11) 
Political party organisation 
and networks. 
District courts with 
magistrates and 
judges (including 
civil and criminal 
courts) 






(491) with elected chair 
and two vice chairs 
(one female) 
Municipalities (225) 
Line ministry officials 





Local political party offices 
UPZ Committees of 
national political parties 
Informal patron-client 
relations (such as 
coordinator of LGSP) 
appointed by MP to bypass 











Networks of kinship 
Patron-client relations 
(Note: some 
definitions of ‘civil 
society’ exclude these 
relationships, others 
are flexible) 
Union Parishad (4,554) 
 
Union committees for 
school, market, law and 
order, etc. 
Union Parishad with 
directly elected Chairman, 
9 general seats, plus 3 
specially reserved for 
women. 
 
Union level branches of 
national political parties. 
Village courts 















structures if occupied 
by opposition)  
 
Ad hoc structures of 
governance such as 
the Unit Office in the 
slum site. 
Ward Committees (9 
wards per union) 
 
Villages (86,038)  
 
Political party activists 
Community police at Ward 
level. 
Gram sarkar village 
government (abolished 
2007). Ward sabha 
meetings since 2011. 
 
 Village 
development and 
welfare 
associations 
 
NGO-formed 
grassroots groups 
for savings/other 
activities 
Gusti (patrilineages) 
Samaj (social 
groupings) 
Mosque/temple 
committees 
Shalish (informal 
courts) 
Philanthropic activity 
Collective action 
groups (e.g. 
journalists) 
 
